Power and Authority in the Production of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

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United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was adopted in 2000 with the aim of ensuring all efforts toward peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the conduct of armed conflict itself, would entail sensitivity toward gendered violence and gendered inequalities. In this article, I contrast two accounts of the writing of UNSCR 1325 that issue from the two institutions that claim authority over the document: the United Nations Security Council and the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. I make a broader theoretical argument about the importance of paying analytical attention to the discursive terrain of international institutions when analyzing the formulation and implementation of security policy, concluding that contemporary theorizing of international institutions is productive of a particular configuration of political authority and legitimacy that can, and should, be challenged.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) was adopted as a result of unanimous vote in October 2000. The Resolution was hailed at the time as a vital and innovative political framework that enables the consideration of gender issues during periods of armed conflict as well as in the processes of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The Resolution has since been translated into 80 languages and is used all over the world as a policy tool for implementing gender-sensitive formal and informal political arrangements after the cessation of conflict and as an advocacy tool for securing gender equity in demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programs and peacekeeping operations. As a Security Council Resolution, UNSCR 1325 is legally binding upon states that are signatories of the UN Charter, and must therefore be taken seriously as a political document worthy of analysis, not least because it is argued that, despite the Resolution’s many successes, significant obstacles remain in the translation of the Resolution from policy document to effective advocacy tool and action plan (Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings 2004; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002). This article offers some insight into the impediments to effective implementation, through analysis of the production of the Resolution itself.

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1 Correct at time of writing, although many other translations are in progress. See http://www.peacewomen.org/1325inTranslation/index.html.
In this article, I explore competing accounts of the development of UNSCR 1325 that issue from two sites of discursive power that influenced its production. I use “production” to emphasize the constructed form of the Resolution (i.e., the Resolution was produced over time), and I identify these accounts as “narratives of production” to draw attention to the ways in which the accounts offer different histories—or narratives—of the Resolution from conception to adoption. The two sites of power with which I am concerned are the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Non-Governmental Organisation Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (NGO WG). Both institutions claim authority over the Resolution and are therefore appropriate foci of analysis (see NGO WG 2005; UNSC 2000a). I hyphenate “author-ity” in this article to draw attention to the connotations of both ownership (author) and control (authority) that the word signifies. Neither of these institutions, which for the purposes of analysis will be treated as loosely bounded entities with particular discursive terrains, is monolithic or internally consistent. However, both have distinct narratives of the history of UNSCR 1325 that will be explored in this article.

I aim to draw out the discursive conditions of possibility for the construction of UNSCR 1325 through investigation of the discursive terrains of the two institutions that claim a degree of author-ity over the Resolution. By “discursive terrain,” I mean the multiple discourses that the institutions are product/productive of and the multiple practices of power and representation that constitute the boundaries of that which is intelligible within the institutions. For example, it is “thinkable” within the discursive terrain of the Security Council, as I establish below, that consultation with NGOs can lead to better insight and understanding of a given issue. It is not (yet) thinkable that consultation with randomly selected members of the public would have similarly positive results. These “commonsense” notions are constituted by particular configurations of discourse that, as a whole, have specific horizons of possibility, including certain modes of operation and excluding others.

This analysis challenges conventional theorizing about institutional decision-making, and in the first section below, I evaluate alternative explanations for the ways in which policy documents, particularly UNSCR, are produced. I argue that it is necessary to undertake discourse-theoretical analysis to understand the ways in which the institutional logics of specific sites of power pre/proscribe particular policy realities. I hope to encourage critical interpretations of and reflections on the policy documents that order the lives of individuals everywhere, employing as they do concepts that, like all concepts, are inherently value-laden. As Dvora Yanow (1996) points out, “[i]nterpretations...are more powerful than ‘facts.’ That makes the policy process, in all its phases, a struggle for the determination of meanings” (19). Thus, it is not possible to understand how UNSCR 1325 was produced by, and is productive of, particular conceptualizations of gender and security without interrogating the discursive terrain of the institutions in question. Furthermore, employing a discourse-theoretical analysis of international institutions and their policy production procedures has enormous implications for International Relations as an academic discipline and as policy practice.

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2 It is obviously not sustainable to claim that these are the only two institutions that exercised authority over UNSCR 1325. State governments (particularly the Canadian government), unaffiliated NGOs and other UN agencies all played greater or lesser roles, but none has substantive narratives of production that relate the history of the Resolution in coherent terms.

3 In this article, I use “institutions” as synonymous with “sites of power.” The power I refer to in the latter construction is discursive, and relates to influence and authority over UNSCR 1325. I do not intend to signify through the use of the word “institution” that I conceive of either the UNSC or the NGO WG as coherent or singular entities. This will be expanded on as I explore the discursive terrain of the two institutions and investigate the groups and organizations that comprise them.
Beyond Structure versus Agency

Theorizing the production of the international legal system, of which UNSC Resolutions are a part, entails the rigorous consideration of core concepts of International Relations (IR), including sovereignty, interdependence, and democracy. An orthodoxy rooted in the theoretical synthesis of neorealism and neoliberalism still exists in international relations, both as academic discipline and policy practice. In this context, global governance can be seen as the construction of international institutions configured through liberal values that would further the efforts of states to pursue their interests (see, *inter alia* Keohane 1988, 1998; Keohane and Martin 1995; Kupchan 1998; Martin and Simmons 1998). In terms of the production of policy documents and binding legislation at the international level, International Relations theorists have sought to understand how various international institutions translate the will and interests of their members into efficient policy formulation (see, *inter alia*, Diehl 2001; Wilkinson and Hughes 2002). Conventionally, theories of policy production at the international level tended to focus on either structural power dynamics or the importance of individual agency (see Adler 1997, 333, 336; Hay and Wincott 1998; Wendt 1987).

The emergence of a constructivist orthodoxy in the study of international institutions, which “does not... make any particular claims about the content of social structures or the nature of agents at work in social life” (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 393; see, *inter alia* Johnston 2001; Reimann 2006; Reus-Smit 2001), has also affected the ways in which it is possible to theorize the production of policy in the international domain. On this view, the analytically antagonistic dualism of agency/structure is conceived instead as an ontological relationship that cannot be resolved through empirical analysis (Hay 2002, 91–2). However, work that explicitly collapses the distinction between structure and agency and focuses instead on the ways in which institutions are sites of discursive power and both product/productive of particular discourses that in turn constitute particular horizons of possibility remains relatively rare. Although the institution in question is domestic rather than international, Roxanne Lynn Doty’s (1993) study of the construction of foreign policy is a classic example of the type of research agenda I describe here. Jutta Weldes’s (1998) “critical constructivist” assessment of bureaucratic politics also provides us with the insight that “[t]he language of policymaking...does not simply reflect ‘real’ policy issues and problems; instead, it actively produces the issues with which policymakers deal and the specific problems that they confront” (217).

Inspired by Foucault's (1984) interrogation of the concept of “author” and Doty’s (1997) challenge to the agent-structure problematique in International Relations, the analytical approach I take to the study of international institutions conceptualizes both structure and agents as discursively constituted contingent “subjects,” albeit subjects that are by no means coherent. The contingency of agents and structures precludes their identification as concrete objects of analysis—or explanatory factors—and demands that their (re)production must be analyzed through engagement with the practices that constitute their identities (Doty 1997, 375–79; see also Foucault [1969] 2002, 60). This article identifies the articulation of a “narrative of production” explaining the formulation of UNSCR 1325 as a form of discursive practice, and questions the power relations that are product/productive of such narratives with a view to contributing to debates over author-ity in International Relations. On this view, “[a]gency is not understood as an inherent quality of individual human beings qua human beings, but rather as a positioning of subjects that occurs through practices, practices which are inherently discursive” (Doty 1997, 384). Structures are similarly constituted through the temporary fixing of meaning through discursive practices, “the contingent and arbitrary stop—the necessary and temporary
‘break’ in the infinite semiosis of language” (Hall 1997, 54). Martin and Simmons (1998, 756) argue that the rationalist research agenda concerning international institutions should consider “the questions of how institutions matter, not just whether they do.” This research argues that an alternative agenda might wish to investigate how the discursive terrain of a given institution constrains and permits behavior and thus engages with the question, as Doty (1995, 298) might put it, of how it becomes possible that institutions make the policies that they do.

In this analysis, I aim to illustrate the ways in which particular conceptualizations of gender, violence, the international and security organized and structured discussions of “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (which is the title of the Resolution as noted on the website of the United Nations) previous to the production of UNSCR 1325, thus having a clear impact on the Resolution itself. Rather than attempting to identify and measure various quantitative indicators regarding political will, access, and influence in the production of UNSCR 1325, I analyze the competing narratives concerning the Resolution through six key documents, three from each of the institutions claiming author-ity over the document. In the case of the NGO WG, the texts are a letter to the UNSC from October, 23rd, 2000 (NGO WG 2000a), the statement that was produced for the Arria formula meeting to discuss the possibility of a UNSCR addressing “the impact of armed conflict on women and girls” (NGO WG 2000b), and a statement made to the assembled press following the Arria formula meeting (NGO WG 2000c). The key texts of the UNSC include Chapters II–VII of the Charter of the United Nations (United Nations 1945), the statement of the UN concerning the provisional rules that govern the actions of the UNSC (United Nations 1983), and a statement from the President of the Security Council on March 8th, 2000 (UNSC 2000b), which was International Women’s Day. These documents have been chosen as they are given textual priority in UNSCR 1325 and also because the institutions themselves cite them as fundamental to the production of UNSCR 1325. In the following section, I analyze the narratives of production of the two institutions, beginning with the narratives issuing from the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security.

The Competing Narratives of Production I: The NGO WG

Regarding the legitimacy of NGOs and the need to consult with such organizations, the official position of the UN Security Council has developed relatively recently into a recognition of positive potential. In 1968, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed Resolution 1296 that addressed the “arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organisations” (ECOSOC 1968). However, it was not until almost 30 years later that these arrangements were reviewed at the recommendation of a working group established by ECOSOC, leading to the approval of Resolution 1996/31 in 1996. Marking what Tony Hill (2004) has termed a “second generation” of NGO–UN relations, this Resolution codified a new set of arrangements between NGOs and the UN system. This led to the current situation in which “NGOs are omnipresent in the policy and administrative process of UN organizations” and the recognition that “the
extent of their participation has progressively deepened” since the end of the Cold War (Gordenker and Weiss 1996, 43).

One of the issue areas pertinent to this investigation that informed negotiations between NGOs and the UN was the issue of gender mainstreaming. “Delegates at the 1975 UN International Women’s Year conference in Mexico City declared that all governments should establish agencies dedicated to promoting gender equality and improving the status and conditions of women” (True and Mintrom 2001, 30). This not only built on existing institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women’s issues, such as the UN Division for the Advancement of Women, but also represented the work undertaken by transnational networks and the building of links between various levels of political activity, from local/domestic women’s organizations through to global/international policy networks and other institutions. Drawing on the successes of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), and the ever-strengthening linkages between feminist theorists/activists and the UN system, the UN World Conferences on Women every 5 years from 1975 were increasingly well attended, leading to the 1995 Conference in Beijing which “was the largest UN conference up to that time. More NGOs than ever before were affiliated to the intergovernmental conference, while some 30,000 people participated in the NGO forum” (Steans 2003, 134). The outcome document, the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA), is hailed as a watershed document for the securing of women’s rights. As Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini and Judy El-Bushra (2004) argue:

[the BPFA is not only comprehensive but has also set clear benchmarks and a vision for improving women’s lives. With, 188 states as signatories, it is an influential international document on women’s rights. At Beijing, the impact of armed conflict on women was noted as a specific emerging issue requiring attention. Its inclusion in the Platform for Action spurred the growth of a global women’s peace movement (13).

Thus, it is possible to trace the roots of the NGO WG back through decades of feminist theorizing and activism. Following the conference in Beijing, it was argued that “realization of the potential we viewed...requires vigorous leadership and a willingness to engage in open and often difficult political dialogue across many differences that tend to divide women” (Bunch and Fried 1996, 204). This research details the ways in which the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security responded to that challenge and were instrumental in the production of UNSCR 1325.

During the period in which Bangladesh held the Security Council Presidency, which will be discussed in more detail below, the Women and Armed Conflict caucus liaised with the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) regarding “obstacles to implementing the chapter of the Beijing Platform for Action... devoted to women and armed conflict” (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003, 1256). The caucus made a series of recommendations to the Security Council under the auspices of a Special Session on women, and once the negotiations with the CSW came to an end, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security was formed from the group of NGOs who were involved in the caucus (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003, 1257–258). The NGO WG, in their own words, “was formed in May 2000 to

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7 UNDAW was established in 1946 and “advocates the improvement of the status of women of the world and the achievement of their equality with men” (UNDAW 2007). For further information, see their website at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/index.html.
successfully advocate for a UNSCR on women, peace and security” (NGO WG 2005). They agreed “to pursue two recommendations—to encourage women’s participation in peace agreements and to push for the convening of a special session of the Security Council” that would eventually lead to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 (Hill, Aboitiz, and Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003). The strategies of the NGO WG were many and various:

Members of the coalition lobbied and debated with every Security Council member. They created a list of experts and NGOs that would speak to the issues in the Security Council. They compiled packets of relevant documents with summaries and hand-delivered them to all Security Council members, and undertook media strategy to maximise attention on this issue (Poehlman-Doumbouya and Hill 2001).

The NGOs involved in the NGO WG were the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Amnesty International (AI), International Alert (IA), the Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children (WCRWC), and the Hague Appeal for Peace (HAP).

Since October 2000, the membership of the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security has increased enormously. However, for the purposes of this investigation, “the membership” includes only those NGOs involved with the Working Group at the time that UNSCR 1325 was produced. A brief investigation of the five founding members of the NGO WG illustrates the priority afforded by all five organizations to peacebuilding and the protection of human rights. The HAP explicitly links these two issue-areas, stating that the organization is “dedicated to the abolition of war and making peace a human right” (2005), as does IA, arguing that “the denial of human rights often [leads] to internal armed conflicts which in turn undermine[s] efforts to protect individual and collective human rights and to promote sustainable development” (2007). IA was founded “in 1985 by a group of human rights advocates led by the former Secretary-General of AI...in response to growing concerns expressed by those working in international development agencies, human rights organizations, and those involved in the issues of ethnic conflict and genocide” (HAP 2007), so the continuity demonstrated between IA and AI is not entirely unexpected.

As part of its mandate, the WCRWC states that the organization campaigns with and on behalf of displaced “women and children,” arguing that “their empowerment is the surest route to the greater well-being of all forcibly displaced people” (2007). This links with the emphasis put on “sustainable human development” by IA, and also with the WILPF’s goal of “enhanc[ing] environmentally sustainable development” (2007). The performative function of organizing discourse on peace and security around the signifier of “development” is explored more comprehensively in the final section of this article. For the current purposes, it illustrates the comparable values propounded by each of the founding members of the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security. Another key value is the potential of civil society activism to effect change at the state and supra-state level, suggested by Amnesty International’s (2007) declaration of independence from “any government, political ideology, economic interest or religion,” WCRWC’s commitment to facilitating communications “from the community level to the highest councils of governments and international organizations” (Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children 2007) and WILPF’s aim of “support[ing] the civil society to democratize the United Nations system” (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 2007). Again, the implications of this are discussed further below.

The first text I analyze in this section is the letter from the NGO WG to UN Security Council members dated October 23rd, 2000. In brief, the letter outlines
the hopes of the NGO WG, celebrates the forthcoming Arria formula meeting and offers to the Security Council a “comprehensive pack of materials” (NGO WG 2000a) relating to the issue of women, peace, and security. The Open Session is lauded as a “historic event and a significant opportunity to move the agenda forward” (NGO WG 2000a), suggesting that there was a pre-existing agenda and that the actions of the Namibian Presidency offered an opportunity to move the agenda in ways that the NGO WG would find acceptable. The language of the letter is appropriately formal and persuasive, given that the NGO WG does not enjoy any official powers of consultation with the Security Council. The NGO WG states their requests in quiescent terms: “The NGO Working Group...is hoping that the Open Session results in” certain measures and “would like to see a commitment to follow up the outcomes of the Open Session” (NGO WG 2000a). In conclusion, the letter states that the Group is “very much looking forward...[to] establishing a dialogue with you [the Security Council] on this matter” (NGO WG 2000a). Phrasing the requests in this way, with attention to “establishing a dialogue,” is not only testament to the desire of the NGO WG to ensure ongoing communication with the SC about gender and security, but also recognizes that, in the context of a discussion about issues of security, the UN Security Council enjoys a degree of institutional power and privilege that the NGO WG does not, but also that, even if the Open Session yields spectacular results, the issue of women, peace, and security will be ongoing.

The first of the NGO WG’s hopes is that “gender issues” will be “fully mainstreamed into the actions and operations resulting from the Council’s decisions” (NGO WG 2000a). Although the language of “mainstreaming” is by no means unproblematic (see Baden and Goetz 1997; Daly 2005; Shepherd 2007; Walby 2005), the significance of asking that “the actions and operations” of the UN Security Council be undertaken with a gendered sensitivity is great. Previous to the historic moment documented in the texts under analysis here, the UNSC “remained tenaciously state-centered, militaristic, and male-dominated” (Otto 2004, 1). As Cohn (2004) argues, “Previously, on those rare occasions when women showed up in Security Council resolutions at all, it has been in passing reference to women as victims, or women as a ‘vulnerable group’” (8). Therefore, the NGO WG requesting that the Council approach issues of peace and security with an awareness of gendered differences, and experiences can be read as a potentially radical demand. The two further suggestions that the NGO WG details in its letter represent much more conventional conceptualizations of gender. The Security Council is asked “to ensure that women play a greater role, at all levels, in peace support operations, conflict prevention and peace building” and to “afford women and girls greater protection and assistance in situations of armed conflict” (NGO WG 2000a). These constructions relate directly to the representations of gender in UNSCR 1325, the eventual outcome of these negotiations, in which “women” are (re)produced through the text as able to participate and represent in peace-building and conflict resolution, but also needing protection during conflict (UNSC 2000a, Preamble, Articles, 1-5, 8, 10; see also Carpenter 2005).

Considering the three results that the NGO WG hoped to achieve as a package of reform, it is clear from even a cursory reading of UNSCR 1325 that its hopes were, to an extent, realized. One of the Working Group’s recommendations was that the Open Session be followed up “with a report on (1) women’s role in peace building and (2) humanitarian issues and protection of women during peacekeeping and post conflict peace support operations” (NGO WG 2000a). These Reports were indeed undertaken—in fact, mandated in the UNSC Resolution that resulted from the Open Session and other negotiations (UNSC 2000a)—and, importantly, there have been recent efforts toward “the incorporation of a gender perspective in all conflict prevention work” (UNSC 2004) and
the preparation of “‘a framework for the system-wide cooperation...for the full implementation of resolution 1325’” (UNSC 2005). Furthermore, the Security Council was offered “the opportunity to enter into dialogue with NGOs who are working directly with women and girls affected by armed conflict” (NGO WG 2000a), and the institution seems to have availed itself of this opportunity (Hill 2002, 29–30; Pietilä 2002, 96–8).

However, given that the heading of the letter reads “United Nations Security Council Open Session on Women, Peace and Security,” it is not entirely surprising that the subject of the discussion is women rather than gender. The reforms, with the exception of the attention called to the mainstreaming of “gender issues,” focus on “women and girls” and the gendered issues are represented as women’s issues: “women’s role in peace building,” the “protection of women,” and “women and girls affected by armed conflict” (NGO WG 2000a). This assumed translatability of women to gender is not theorized or explained within the document, and reflects a concern on behalf of the NGO WG both to demand the recognition of the “positive role of women” as well as the need for their protection (NGO WG 2000a). The statement read out by representatives of the NGO WG at the Arria formula meeting, the second document I analyze here, is faithful to these constructions of gender. The statement notes that “women are neither simply victims, nor are they passive in the face of war. Even in the worst and most dangerous of circumstances, women have shown their courage and leadership” (NGO WG 2000b, 2). Neither the statement, nor the letter discussed above represents women as perpetrators of violence. Women’s agency, counterposed to the assumption of passivity that the NGO statement argues against, is fixed in these documents as benign, a construction that is highly problematic (El Jack 2003; Moser and Clark 2001).

In the statement produced by the NGO WG for the Arria formula meeting, the link between conflict and violence is made explicit: “women” are represented as “women victims of violent conflict” (NGO WG 2000b, 1). Moreover, “violence against women” is articulated as “‘a strategic weapon of war...a method of ethnic cleansing and an element of genocide” (NGO WG 2000b, 1). Women are still fixed in this narrative as eternal victims of violence. Even the agency discussed above is not secure. Forms of discursive and physical violence contribute to “women’s voices and their experiences [being] excluded and marginalized” from “peace deals and high level negotiations” (NGO WG 2000b, 3). While this violence may be empirically verifiable, its reproduction in the NGO statement assigns women “‘a certain type of agency and identity, namely, women are the objects of protective action and they occupy mainly the civilian space’” (Väyrynen 2004, 137).

The positioning of “women and civil society,” run together in the text to form a discursive linkage, is articulated as a locus of benevolent agency (NGO WG 2000b, 4). This not only draws on the constructions of gender discussed above, but also on theorizing of state/civil society negotiations that situate civil society as a domain apart from the state and therefore unimpeded by (state) political considerations (see, inter alia, Baker 2000; Lipschutz 1992). Within this discourse, “civil society” represents:

> a bottom-up vision of civilising world order. It represents a normative theory of “human governance” which is grounded in the existence of a multiplicity of “communities of fate” and social movements, as opposed to the individualism and appeals to rational self-interest of neo-liberalism (Held and McGrew 1998, 241).

The concept of civil society is ideologically and normatively loaded with implications of its civilized nature and its social form, and, as Jan Aart Scholte (2002)
argues, “carries connotations of civility and virtue” (19) that function to secure a place from which to speak that is located firmly on the moral high ground. Stephen Hopgood (2000), for example, is openly skeptical concerning the emergence of “global civil society,” perceiving this theoretical construct to be, contra David Held and Anthony McGrew, intimately related to the triumph of a neoliberal world order (25). These contestations over the construction of civil society draw attention to just how important it is to question the representation of “women and civil society” in the NGO statement. Running the two nouns together suggests that they are inextricably—and analytically—linked, as in Cynthia Enloe’s famous formulation of “women and children” (1990). Furthermore, this representation doubles the impact of the absenting of a formal political domain: “women” are assumed to inhabit an apolitical space and “civil society” is by definition separate from formal, or state, politics.

The press statement that was released following the Arria formula meeting in part reproduces the statement made at the meeting itself (NGO WG 2000c). However, as it is a public document presented to the world media, it is worthy of analytical attention in its own right. In the statement, the NGO representative describes “women’s groups and local organizations that struggle every day to prevent war” (NGO WG 2000c, emphasis added). This construction functions not only to reproduce a distinction between the international as a zone of peace and the domestic as a zone of conflict (Väyrynen 2004, 130–31), but also to reaffirm the construction of women’s agency articulated in the two documents discussed previously, as signified by the description of ongoing “struggle.”

The direct and indirect violence against women presented in the statement to the Arria formula meeting are reproduced in the press statement, and the NGO WG condemns those who act as “silent witnesses to these abuses,” arguing that “[a] culture of silence and impunity prevails” (NGO WG 2000c). This representation draws heavily on the spatial metaphors employed in theory and activism challenging the problem of domestic violence; part of the framing of domestic violence as a public policy issue was to challenge the notion that such violence is legitimate because it occurs behind the closed doors of the private household (see, inter alia, Moore 2003; Shepherd 2005; Youngs 2003). It also serves as an indictment of the “international community,” which had, thus far, not acted as a vocal witness to the abuses through their failure to put the issue of women, peace and security on the agenda of the UN Security Council.

“[T]he culture of impunity” is stressed in the press statement (NGO WG 2000c) and functions to remind the audience that the crimes and abuses documented in the statement need not occur. If only there was an internationally binding UNSC Resolution preventing such abuses, “the plight of women in war zones” would be ameliorated and the women would have “the protection they need” (NGO WG 2000c). The efforts of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security are not adequately represented in this construction. The NGO WG reports that they “asked the Security Council to ensure women have equal representation … [and] that they consider the plight of women” (NGO WG 2000c). These tentative terms do not adequately describe what was an historic and transformative campaign on the behalf of the NGO WG. As evidenced in this section, the NGO WG has a strong claim to author-ity over the Resolution, and, through its continued political presence,8 the Working Group has been able to transform decades of theorizing and activism into concrete achievements in the issue area of women, peace, and security. However, the United Nations maintains a degree of institutional control over the Resolution, and the

8 See www.womenpeacesecurity.org/ for an indication of the ways in which the NGO Working Group has both expanded in membership and continued to lobby for the rights of women in armed conflict from 2000 to the present day.
Security Council, as the organization through which the Resolution became binding international law, must be investigated.

The Competing Narratives of Production II: The UN

It is not analytically tenable to treat the United Nations as a monolithic organization. However, the foundational principles laid down in the Charter in 1945 have undoubtedly impacted on the processes and practices of organizations within the system. For example, in Article 24.1 of the Charter, “Members [of the United Nations] confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (United Nations 1945, Article 24.1). Signatories of the Charter agree to be bound by the principles and procedures therein, and Resolutions passed by the UNSC have the status of international law. The Security Council, therefore, enjoys considerable institutional and legislative powers.

Since the end of the Cold War, “the role of the Security Council not only in conferring legitimacy on certain forms of international intervention, but also in providing a mechanism for burden-sharing of expenses and risk, in an era averse to both, [has] once again prov[ed] indispensable” (Malone 2000, 40). The veto power of the five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation [formerly USSR], U.K., U.S.A.) apparently deadlocked voting during the Cold War, effectively rendering the Security Council powerless in the face of threats to the international peace and security that it was charged with protecting. However, there was a “noticeable improvement” in relations among the P5 as the 1980s drew to a close and a new decade began (Malone 2000, 21). The 1990s saw a series of changes in the performance of the UNSC, not only in the number of Resolutions tabled and passed but also in the issue-areas with which the UNSC concerned itself (Golberg and Hubert 2001, 223–24; Malone 2000, 22–3). The issue of human rights was given textual priority in the UN Charter in 1945: the second sentence of the Preamble reaffirms “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” (United Nations 1945, Preamble). However, the 1990s was the decade in which the issue of human rights became central to the activities and decision-making of the UNSC (Malone 2000, 28). At the 1992 summit meeting, the first to be held at the level of heads of state and government, the Security Council recognized that “non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security” (UNSC 1992), indicating a significant shift in the Council’s agenda.

By 1999, the discursive terrain of the Security Council as an institution was such that it was able to address “new” security issues in the cases before it and focus on “how best to incorporate human security into the council’s program of work” (Golberg and Hubert 2001, 224). As discussed in the section that contextualizes the NGO WG, framing policy issues as human security issues, blending as it does the ideological weight of human rights discourse with the strategic implications of security discourse, allowed for alternative performance of security by the UNSC. In addition, it was during the 1990s that NGO involvement with the Security Council became commonplace. “Council members increasingly met with NGOs on their own and in groups, not only to brief them on recent developments...but also to seek their input” (Malone 2000, 33). At the 4,100th meeting of the UNSC in March 2000, the President of the Security Council reinforced this beneficial arrangement and applauded the role of NGOs in providing “humanitarian assistance and alleviating the impact of humanitarian crises” (UNSC 2000c).
Furthermore, the Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to a broadly conceived notion of “humanitarian issues,” stating that:

The Security Council recognizes the importance of the humanitarian dimension to the maintenance of international peace and security and to its consideration of humanitarian issues relating to the protection of all civilians and other non-combatants in situations of armed conflict (UNSC 2000c).

Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000), addressing the protection of civilians in armed conflict, were central to the foundations of UNSCR 1325, and, crucially, functioned to suggest that the UN Security Council recognizes the protection of civilians as an issue that falls under its remit (Golberg and Hubert 2001, 228). The UN Secretary-General produced Reports in 2000 addressing not only the issue of children and armed conflict (UNSC 2000d) but also the role of the UN during periods of disarmament and reintegration (UNSC 2000e). Both of these Reports focus in part on the importance of displaying a gendered sensitivity to the issues of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction (UNSC 2000d, Articles 34–37; UNSC 2000a, Articles 7, 22, 53, 77, 93–94). The Presidential statement of 13 March 2000 states that:

the Council stresses the importance of providing attention to all those in need, with particular emphasis on women and children and other vulnerable groups (UNSC 2000c, emphasis added).

Later in 2000, the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a statement to the Security Council at the opening of a meeting on women, peace and security, arguing that the contribution of women to conflict resolution processes and peace-building was “severely under-valued” and that women are “often better equipped than men to prevent or resolve” conflict (United Nations 2000). This meeting took place in October 2000. UNSC Resolution 1325 was adopted on October 31st, 2000. The UN Security Council enjoys considerable institutional privilege within the United Nations system. In part due to the historic foundations of the United Nations, “[t]he Security Council has primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each of its members must be present at all times at United Nations headquarters” (United Nations 2007). As the Charter is cited not only in UNSCR 1325 (UNSC 2000a, Preamble) but also in the ways in which the Security Council represents itself on its homepages, the appropriate section of the Charter, Chapters II–VII, is the first of the texts I analyze in this section.

Membership of the United Nations since 1945, when the UN Charter was signed, has been dependent on recommendation from the Security Council. While the General Assembly, a nominally democratic forum in which member states each have a vote and recommendations require a two-thirds majority (United Nations 1945, Articles 18.1–18.2), decides on the result of an application, the application is only brought forward “upon the recommendation of the Security Council” (United Nations 1945, Article 4.1). Similarly, membership privileges may be suspended or member states expelled according to the directives of the UNSC (United Nations 1945, Articles 5–6). Thus, although the Security Council is one of six principle organs of the United Nations systems established at its inception, the institutional power it wields is considerable.

The use of the modal verb “shall” throughout the Charter is suggestive of the purpose of the document: while it forms binding international law upon signing and ratification (United Nations 1945, Article 110), the terms of this law are expressed in the future tense. Interestingly, the functions and powers of the
General Assembly (United Nations 1945, Articles 10–17) are predominantly articulated using the modal verb “may,” for example, “[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter” (United Nations 1945, Article 10). This is contrary to the explication of the functions and powers of the Security Council (United Nations 1945, Articles 24–26) which insist that “the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” (United Nations 1945, Article 24.2). Furthermore, and most indicative of the privilege of the Security Council is Article 25, which states that “[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter” (United Nations 1945, Article 25).

The powers of the Security Council are wide ranging. The implications for the “international community” of signing and ratifying a Charter that provides for the Security Council to “adopt its own rules of procedure” (United Nations 1945, Article 30) and for member states to be consulted “whenever the latter [the UNSC] considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected” (United Nations 1945, Article 31) are huge. The extreme centralization of such a variety of powers is in part what has lead to the continued vocalization of calls for Security Council reform (Sutterlin 2003, 5–10). As Ted Galen Carpenter (1997) argues, “throughout the history of the UN, the preference has clearly been for stability even when the results have been manifestly unjust. …The veto power exercised by the five permanent members of the Security Council ensures …that they will never be subject to UN-sanctioned coercive measures” (20).

The phraseology of the UN Charter, particularly the Articles that dictate the conduct of the Security Council, demonstrates just how remarkable an achievement it was to successfully frame gendered violence as an issue of international security. According to the Charter, there are “parties to any dispute” (United Nations 1945, Article 33) and “[a]ny Member of the United Nations … or any state” may be “party to a dispute” (United Nations 1945, Article 32, emphasis added). This demonstrates a state-centric conceptualization not only of conflict but also of security, and puts the problem-solving power firmly in the hands of the UN Security Council:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security (United Nations 1945, Article 34).

With this in mind, investigating the procedural rules of the UNSC is necessary to evaluate just how it became possible for the Security Council to recognize the claims made by the NGO WG as valid.

The Rules of Procedure (United Nations 1983), most recently amended in December 1982, provide the UNSC with guidance concerning all aspects of its functioning as a UN organization. Again, the Rules are articulated in the future tense, predominantly using the modal verb “shall.” The UNSC is required to meet at least once every 14 days, and meetings can be called by the president or...
“at the request of any member of the Security Council” (United Nations 1983, Rules 1–2). Again, this demonstrates how much institutional capacity the Security Council has to determine the agenda of issues of international peace and security. Matters for discussion are filtered through the Secretary-General but “approved by the President of the Security Council” (United Nations 1983, Rule 7) and, in conjunction with the permanent status on the Council of the P5, this effectively ensures that six individuals, five of whom are unchanging, have enormous control over the agenda.

Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, the gender pronoun “he” is mentioned in the section of the Rules governing representation and credentials:

Each member of the Security Council shall be represented at the meetings of the Security Council by an accredited representative. The credentials of a representative … shall be communicated to the Secretary-General…before he takes his seat on the Security Council (United Nations 1983, Rule 13).

Furthermore, the President of the Security Council is articulated as male in the document, and expected to absent himself from any discussions in which he might have a conflict of interest (United Nations 1983, Rule, 20). The UN Secretary-General is expected to act in the capacity of Secretariat for the UNSC, although he too may “authorize a deputy to act in his place at meetings of the Security Council” (United Nations 1983, Rule 21). Although such close attention to the representation of gendered subjects in the Rules may seem unwarranted, it is precisely the focus of this investigation: the representations of subjects and objects enable certain ways of thinking about and acting on these constructions. Furthermore, such representation is contrary to what Robert Connell (2005) suggests about “discussions of women’s exclusions from power and decision making [where] men are implicitly present as the power holders” (1806, emphasis added)—in the case of the United Nations Security Council, according to its Rules of Procedure, men are explicitly the power holders.

Membership of the United Nations organization is dependent on the recommendation of the UNSC. The recommendation is further dependent on “the applicant [being] a peace-loving State” (United Nations 1983, Rule 60). Given what I have outlined above regarding the centralization of power in the Security Council, this Rule effectively means that the UNSC has veto power over the possibility of expanding membership of the United Nations organization. Potentially, then, the General Assembly, functioning on a one-nation one-vote remit, could be constructed according to the whims of the Security Council. This has important implications for the democratic credentials of the United Nations and its ability to represent “we, the people.”

Consultation with “the people,” or, more specifically, with “private individuals and non-governmental bodies” is also governed by the Rules. However, Appendix A addresses only the circulation of communications to members of the Security Council (United Nations 1983, Appendix). There is no provision in the Rules that governs the decision of the Security Council regarding which “individuals and non-governmental bodies” could or should be consulted. Despite this lack of formal provision, since the end of the Cold War and subsequent shifts in the organizing discourses of the UNSC, consultation with NGOs became increasingly common. “NGOs...increasingly appeared as actors in the policy process that could not be ignored and whose goodwill and support was useful, and at times even essential, to the success of government policies and Council initiatives” (Paul 2004). Eventually, in 1995, the NGO Working Group on the Security Council was founded, and it “has become an influential forum at the United Nations” (Paul 2004).
Despite strong P5 objections, the Arria formula for meetings between the UNSC and the NGO Working Group was utilized to great effect in April, 2000 when, under Canadian Presidency, Ambassador Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands convened an Arria briefing on “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” Resolution 1296 was adopted and is recognized as the outcome document from the negotiations that took place while the Security Council was officially in session 5 days later. As discussed in the preceding section, UNSCR 1296 is closely related to UNSCR 1325, and the successes of the NGO Working Group on Security evidenced in the production of Resolution 1296 opened the Arria formula to NGOs and other issue areas—notably, in this instance, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. However, previous even to the Arria meeting in April, the UNSC, under the Presidency of Bangladesh, made an historic statement on the occasion of International Women’s Day (UNSC 2000b). In this statement to the attendant media, “members of the Security Council recognize[d] that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men” (UNSC 2000b). NGO involvement with issues under the remit of the Security Council was also celebrated in the statement, as “members welcome[d] the review of the Fourth World Conference on Women as an essential element in achieving this goal” (UNSC 2000b). As discussed previously, the conference at Beijing involved more NGOs than any other World Conference, and was instrumental in forging the agenda for the NGO WG on Women, Peace and Security.

The conceptualization of gender in the press statement is a liberal one. The key articulations include “equality,” adequate representation, “equal access and full participation” and political and economic empowerment (UNSC 2000b). Underpinning these constructions is a commitment to a liberal democratic ideal, and this conceptualization of gender is not incompatible with either a discourse of security that focuses on “international” or “human” security, nor is it incompatible with research on “gender violence.” Both of these discourses construct a liberal individual as their subject. Although the press statement represents gendered violence as “violence against women,” this is represented as corollary to “violation of the human rights of women,” where human rights are themselves an articulation of liberal values (UNSC 2000b).

The obligations of the “international community” are documented in the press statement: “all concerned” must “refrain from human rights abuses in conflict situations” and those responsible must be prosecuted (UNSC 2000b). Although the statement constructs the subject of women as what is by now a familiar profile of peace-maker/victim, and implicit in the statement is the notion that the UNSC can and should help women to fulfill their potential: “the importance of promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective into all policies and programs while addressing armed or other conflicts” is stressed (UNSC 2000b). The disparity between the “women” and the “gender perspective” is never clearly articulated, indeed, it is a function of the liberal framework that gender is synonymous with sex difference.

It is the final sentence however, referring to “a gender perspective,” which allows the greatest potential for radical reform. In the following section I draw together the arguments I have outlined in this article, reflecting on the implications of these arguments for the construction of UNSCR 1325 and analyzing further the potentialities offered by the narratives of production explored here. The intention of this article is not to evaluate “the truth” of the production of UNSCR 1325, but rather to explore the ways in which the two institutions represent their involvement with the Resolution. However, as the following section indicates, the potentialities enabled by the discursive terrains of the institutions not only enabled the production of the Resolution, but also limited it in several important ways.
Challenging the Narratives of Production

Reading the two narratives of production in tandem, it is possible to identify some organizational logics common to both narratives. Both narratives construct particular representations of governance, peacebuilding, and development, and these representations are explored in turn below. In addition, I argue in this section that both narratives function to (re)produce a conventional, liberal “Westphalian” narrative of sovereignty, largely by its representation as an absent presence. In short, by drawing out the commonalities and differences in the two narratives of production, I aim to demonstrate that, despite significant differences in institutional power and internal organization between the two sites of power under consideration, the dominant logics in the discourses of gender, violence, and security issuing from these sites are compatible. It is these compatibilities that lead to both the successes and shortcomings of UNSCR 1325 by delimiting the boundaries of possibility of the Resolution and its implementation.

Although the NGO WG fosters an image of collective action that is opposed to the notion that the existence of a democratic deficit at either the state or supra-state level is in any way tenable (see Cox and Jacobson 2005; Gill 1996; Moravcsik 2004; Murphy 2002), through its emphasis on participation and representation, the very simple question of “Who speaks?” in this situation is an important one (see Ougaard and Higgott 2002; Wilkinson 2002). Deniz Kandiyoti (2004) points out that “[a]s donors, UN agencies and NGOs compete for their share in the ‘gender’ market, often draining limited local capacity to staff their own projects in the process, there is a risk that local voices (especially non-English speaking ones) may be drowned out” (135). This is in part due to the fact that “[m]ost NGO activity at the global level is dominated by representatives from the industrialized countries” (Williams 2003, 85).

In addition to the question of “Who speaks?,” the question of to what they are speaking remains. The two different conceptualizations of global governance outlined above suggest that it is a complicated terrain to negotiate. The narratives issuing from the NGO WG and the UNSC seem to suggest that they share a conceptualization of “global governance,” and that the involvement of “global civil society” in these mechanisms of governance is seen as fundamentally benign by both parties. Recognizing the NGO WG as an effective agent in the construction of world politics articulated by the United Nations Security Council legitimizes the activities of the NGO WG and also functions to cast the issues of women, peace, and security in the light of “the global”—that is, “it is now increasingly recognized that...processes of restructuring have a transnational dimension and that their effects on democracy...need to be analysed as part of the wider globalisation phenomenon” (Eschle 2002, 320; emphasis added). However, labeling phenomena as part of an inexorable push toward globality “may serve to summon precisely the effects that such a discourse attributes to globalisation itself” (Hay and Marsh 2000, 9), if “globalization” is conceived of as a discourse with a particular politics.

If this is the case, then the particular discourse of globality, or globalization, that is (re)produced by the two institutions in question must be analyzed. I argue that the discourse of globalization in this case constructs a concept of “development” as a central signifier, and is best characterized as strongly neoliberal. Craig Murphy (2000) expresses this view succinctly: “If there is a global polity, then certainly its dominant ideology, now, is liberalism, both economic and political” (792). This is relevant to the constitution of the concepts of gender violence and international security in this discursive context as the concepts are brought together in these contexts such that they construct a particular notion of statebuilding and peacemaking—otherwise known as “development.” Rupert
(2000, 42) argues that the unproblematic reproduction of this globalization discourse underpins and therefore makes possible a “hegemonic project of liberal globalization.” This is closely tied to the concept of “global governance,” particularly by scholars such as Stephen Gill (1995), who argues that “[d]isciplinary neoliberalism is institutionalised at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms...[which] can be defined as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism ... the sole model for future development” (412).

At the Beijing conference, the outcome document of the Beijing Platform for Action, cited UNSCR 1325 as part of its documentary heritage, “there was no alternative voice offered in opposition to the benefits of market policies; the goal was to ensure women’s participation in, and access to, the dominant structures of the market” (Chinkin 2000, 247). The participation of women in development—or “reconstruction”—is prioritized by both institutions (NGO WG 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; UNSC 2000b, 2000c). However, “the type of social transformation agenda implicit in global neo-liberal governance, as applied to state-building, has to be interrogated from a gender perspective” (Kandiyoti 2004, 135). The image in which societies torn by conflict are to be rebuilt is decidedly conservative, drawing on concepts of state and sovereignty from the narrative issuing from the UN Security Council, despite the emphasis put on the participation, representation, and protection of women (UNSC 2000b).

Problematising the concept of development that is reproduced through the narratives of production of UNSCR 1325, and also in the Resolution itself, is necessary, particularly given that so much feminist work over recent decades has critiqued the imposition of top-down development and reconstruction programs, citing their deleterious effects on marginalized sectors of society (see, *inter alia*, Marchand and Sisson Runyan 2000; Runyan 2003). The “sustainability” of development is centralized in both narratives, but the latter is not opened to critical scrutiny. This in itself is problematic, as development signifies development (read: progression) from an undesirable starting point to a more desirable end point. “Development,” then, is thoroughly bound up with narratives of modernity and civilization:

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, development was equated with ‘civilisation,’ which was measured by the adoption of institutions and culture ... As Western society became increasingly secular and technical, the notion of Christian ‘civilisation’ was replaced by a belief in modernity, particularly economic and political development (Parpart 1995, 224).

Unquestioningly reproducing a dominant discourse of development that has its antecedents in such a belief system, and draws discursive power from the seemingly inevitable logic of neoliberal globalization discourse, effectively prescribes the possibility of reimagining development and prescribes its unproblematised undertaking.

“International peace and security” (UNSC 2000a, Preamble), on this view, can be achieved by appropriate reconstruction and peace(state)building. This policy prescription echoes theorizing in the discipline of International Relations that argues that “certain forms of economic and political organisation are more conducive than others to peace and stability within communities; that conflict within states has an impact on the international system...that threatens security” (Newman 2001, 248). Proponents of this thesis, often labeled a “democratic peace thesis” (see, *inter alia*, Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Russett 1993; Starr 1992), unreflectively “presuppose the territorial state—‘democracy’ refers to a particular set of electoral institutions and political and civil rights within the boundaries of a sovereign state and ‘war’ [the antonym of ‘peace’] refers to
interstate relations’’ (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 412). However, even in a piece of international legislation such as UNSCR 1325 that pays due attention to conflict at the intra-state level, the implicit assumption seems to be that resolving the conflict and implementing adequate post-conflict reconstruction programs will benefit the ‘‘international community,’’ thus (re)producing both the ‘‘community’’ and ‘‘the international’’ as functional spatial and conceptual domains.

UNSCR 1325 begins to take shape, then, not only as an important outcome document of concerted efforts on behalf of the NGO WG and prolonged discussions of the UN Security Council, but also as the discursive reproduction of discourses of (gender) violence and (international) security, which in turn function to create and perpetuate the divide between ‘‘rich democracies’’ and ‘‘zones of conflict’’ (Keohane 1995, 180). Following a conventional narrative of development, the motif of peace (state) building is visible as a process of maturation, where ‘‘zones of conflict’’ are assisted by the ‘‘international community’’ to integrate into global mechanisms of production and consumption thereby securing not only the conflicts in question but also the reproduction of a neoliberal world order. Sovereignty is a key organizing logic in these discursive processes, and again is tied to the notion that conflict ‘‘zones,’’ or ‘‘undeveloped’’ countries are not sufficiently able to function as full members of the ‘‘international community’’—a kind of ‘‘sovereignty by numbers’’ approach, where the numbers in question are the indices used to measure a state’s incorporation into global political economic processes (see, inter alia, Cammack 2002, 2004; Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Fraser 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002).

The productive power of UNSCR 1325 and associated frameworks for action to discipline political authority reproduces the international as a domain of peace that owns the necessary knowledge to ‘‘develop’’ domestic societies bounded within the confines of the territorial state. Timothy Mitchell (1991) refers to these technologies as ‘‘disciplinary,’’ arguing that they:

work within local domains and institutions, entering into particular social processes, breaking them down into separate functions, rearranging the parts, increasing their efficiency and precision, and reassembling them into more productive and powerful combinations (93, emphasis added).

Within the binary logics that organize IR as a discipline, and the practices of relations international, this reproduction of the international constitutes the ‘‘national’’ as a spatial domain in keeping with the accepted form of political authority recognized by IR as its object of study—the sovereign state, or at the very least, the state that strives to be sovereign.

Fetishising the sovereign state as a form of political authority in this way precludes the conceptualization of alternative forms of political authority that might deliver the radical reforms of social/political order that the Resolution and associated documents purport to seek. International Relations, as both academic discipline and policy practice, has conventionally appealed to the sovereign state as the ontological foundation of knowledge (Ashley 1988; Paul 1999, 218). ‘‘[T]he only state, or political authority if you will, possible in the statist’s ontology is the real-state: hierarchical, coercive and sovereign’’ (Paul 1999, 226). Importantly, however, this article takes seriously R. B. J. Walker’s (1990) request to challenge those representations that unproblematically reproduce the sovereign state as the locus of supreme political authority (169), understanding that such representations limit the imagining of alternative visions of authority and subjectivity. This article has outlined the ways in which UNSCR 1325 was productive of conventional discourses of gender and security, and suggested that the terms used to describe political action and plan future policy could be otherwise imagined to challenge current configurations of social/political authority and subjec-
tivity. The concepts both produced by and productive of policy could reflect an aversion to essentialism, while recognizing that strategic gains can be made through the temporary binding of identities to bodies and constraining of authority within the confines of the territorial state.

Compatible with a liberal narrative of (international) community and a neoliberal emphasis on bounded individuality and the productivity of so constituted individuals, this configuration of political authority functions as what Matthew Sparke (2005) refers to as "a hidden handcuffing of democracy: hidden in part because...the disciplinary effect is market mediated; but also because the reforms...slowly clos[e] down the possibilities for democratic governance" (151). It should be noted that Sparke theorizes this notion in relation to the effects of free-trade agreements, although his concepts are equally applicable to the processes of peace(state)building that Resolution 1325 calls for.

References


